It is time we completely reconsidered our thoughts about ANZUS, the US-Australian alliance, especially as it has functioned during the past 10 years. The accepted view is that the Howard Government has been a loyal and passive follower in the alliance. At best, John Howard's critics may allow that he has played the politics of it shrewdly, gaining electoral advantage from quite small military deployments.

In a new book, The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance Under Bush and Howard, I argue a completely contrary theory. It's my contention that Howard, not George W. Bush, has made the running in the alliance. This is an unusual interpretation in Australian history. Most of our writers tend to acknowledge only brave John Curtin defying Winston Churchill by bringing the troops home as almost the lone pre-Keating Australian PM to act decisively in foreign policy to protect Australia's interests.

In fact, most of our leaders have had a very clear-eyed understanding of where our interests lie. But in any context the past six years or so have been remarkable in the history of the US-Australian alliance. The suggestion that Howard has made the running in the alliance is not so counter-intuitive as it may seem. In an asymmetric relationship - one giant power and one middle power -- the absolute power lies with the bigger player but the initiative lies with the smaller player. The big power has a million other things to worry about. The smaller power can concentrate on getting what it wants from the relationship.

When Howard and his Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, learned that Bush would finally win the disputed 2000 presidential election, they opened a bottle of champagne in Howard's office. They thought Bush offered them much more opportunity than Al Gore would have done and they plotted how to take advantage of this opportunity. Howard came to office in 1996 saying he would intensify the alliance with the US. Although he developed a serviceable modus vivendi with the Clinton administration, it was nothing to write home about and it is hard to see it as closer than the relationship Paul Keating enjoyed with the Clintonites. The advent of Bush changed things. Howard and Downer put a lot of personal effort into cultivating Bush before he was elected. But it was really the terror attacks of 9/11 that gave them the opportunity to change things in the alliance.

So what extra did Howard want from the US connection and what did he get? He wanted: a free trade agreement; enhanced defence co-operation; a much deeper intelligence relationship, including much greater access for Australia; greater Australian influence in US policy-making, especially on Asia; increased US involvement in Asia, particularly Indonesia; the greater prestige for an Australian government in Asia that comes from demonstrating access and influence in Washington; and, of course, Howard also wanted a domestic political pay-off from the relationship.

The fascinating thing is that Howard got all of these results, in greater or lesser degree, and at very little cost. The Howard Government made small but significant military commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan the US had plenty of allies and if anything it was hard for the Australians to get a guernsey. But in Operation Anaconda, in Afghanistan, the Australian Special Air Service saved the bacon of a large group of Americans. The performance of the SAS changed the US attitude to the Australian military. The Americans had always respected our soldiers, but now they wanted them involved as a priority.

In Iraq, the US had few allies. (Britain and Poland were the only others.) There was great art from the Australian Defence Force in designing an Australian contribution that was meaningful, involved the three services but kept the risk of Australian casualties fairly low. This was achieved in part by concentrating on the SAS. The Australian services are all highly professional, but when you see the exploits of the SAS you are forced to the conclusion that they just may be the finest special forces unit in the world. Certainly they did magnificent work in Iraq.

From the Bush administration's point of view, the Howard Government had demonstrated shared values, shared objectives, a willingness to share political and military risk, and relevant capabilities. There is no doubt that in this period Australia has moved up several notches in its alliance with the US, to a level of intimacy and influence it has not enjoyed before. Because most people who write books about this issue are so hostile to the alliance, many incredible stories have been ignored or only partly told.

Canberra has not taken a back seat in the alliance. It has pushed Washington hard for the things it wanted, from a free trade agreement to modifications to US policy on Indonesia. Sometimes it prevented the US from making bad mistakes, as in the case recounted in The Weekend Australian of Australia vetoing certain targets and the use of certain weapons in Iraq. At other times it has lobbied hard but been unsuccessful, as in its efforts to get the Americans to focus more coherently on post-war planning in Iraq.

But Australian policy has been consistently active and ambitious. Examining the Bush-Howard years, four central themes emerge: the Australians have had the initiative in the relationship; ANZUS has gone from being a regional alliance to a global alliance, with Canberra seeing its interests as global and wanting to make a contribution and have an influence in several distant theatres; the Howard Government got most of what it wanted from the US at little cost; and the US alliance greatly enhances Australian national power.

A sub-theme is the concurrent amazing closeness, at the military and security and political levels, with London, and the formation of an effective three-way partnership between Bush, Tony Blair and Howard.

The Howard Government has also tried hard to institutionalise much of the new closeness with Washington, through intelligence-sharing arrangements, placing unprecedented numbers of Australians in US agencies and military commands, the free trade agreement, the habit of US presidential visits and much more. This is an attempt to make the new arrangements survive the eventual departure of Bush and Howard. The finest Australian military, diplomatic and political minds have worked determinedly on the US alliance throughout this period. They have produced fascinating results.

Source

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